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“It would be,” he said without taking notice of my irritation, “in-
teresting for science to watch the mental changes of individuals
on the spot, but . . .” “Are you an alienist?” I interrupted. “Every
doctor should be—a little,” answered that original imper-
turbably. “I have a little theory which you Messieurs who go out
there must help me to prove.”
Joseph Conrad. Heart of Darkness
1. THE ALIENIST’S “LITTLE THEORY”
The Belgian doctor whomCharlie Marlowmeets just before taking off to
the heart of darkness is a minor, irrelevant character who tends to go un-
noticed. Marlow even goes as far as calling him a “harmless fool” (Heart
15). And quite rightly so, since the “old doctor’s” interests in measuring
his patients’ heads with a “thing like callipers” clearly shows that he fol-
lows, à la lettre [to the letter], the notorious craniological theory of Cesare
Lombroso—an Italian jurist who considered that criminal tendencies
were innate in individuals, and that criminals could be recognized by
the shape of their heads (Heart 15).1 Yet, at the same time, this French-
speaking doctor seems to stray from Lombroso’s deterministic physiog-
nomic theory. In fact, he affirms that “the changes take place inside,”
making clear that his true interests do not concern anatomy, but psychol-
ogy instead (Heart 15). And he adds: “it would be interesting for science
to watch the mental changes of individuals on the spot” (Heart 15). What
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the doctor says applies, of course, to his medical practice, so that as Mar-
low impatiently asks, “[a]re you an alienist?” he unequivocally answers,
“every doctor should be—a little” (Heart 15). The actuality of this last
statement in the medical field is, indeed, unquestionable; but cannot the
same be said for humanistic disciplines like literary criticism and the-
ory? After all, psychology has been a crucial component in literary stud-
ies for a while now, and often, literary characters have provided critical
readers with interesting “cases” to solve. It is, thus, in this sense that I
sympathize with the old alienist’s project. In a way, I even intend to con-
tinue, at the literary level, his psychological research. In fact, “I have a
little theory, which you [Mesdames and] Messieurs who go out there [in
that literary jungle which is Heart of Darkness] must help me to prove”
(Heart 15).
After the publication of Albert Guerard’s Conrad the Novelist in
1958—one of the earliest influential studies to explore the psychological
dimension of Heart of Darkness—critics have often invoked the psycho-
analytic notion of “identification” in order to define Marlow’s ambiva-
lent relationship to his double, Mr. Kurtz. This point has been made so
often that Conrad can now be referred to as “a novelist of identification”
(Harpham 131). And indeed, the reference to an affect which troubles
the distinction between “self” and “other(s)” seems particularly apt to
account for Conrad’s career-long fascination with the homo duplex [dou-
ble human].2 And yet, Conrad himself already made clear that “[t]he
homo duplex has, in [his] case, more than one meaning” (qtd. in Hay 32).
In this paper, I suggest that Conrad’s interest in identification is but an
instance of his more general engagement with what I call psychic or af-
fectivemimesis, a form of behavioral imitation whose primary character-
istic consists in generating a psychological confusion between self and
other(s) which, in turn, deprives subjects of their full rational presence to
selfhood, of their capacity to think rationally, of their individual substance,
as it were.3 At work in Conrad’s novella is, quite literally, an outbreak
of such mimetic phenomena: somnambulism, compassion, enthusiasm,
emotional contagion, hypnosis, depersonalization and suggestion are all
fundamentally mimetic, psychic tendencies that haunt the Conradian
conception of the modern subject.
What my “little theory” hopes to “prove” is that Heart of Darkness’s
narrative struggle with colonial praxis and ideology is predicated on a
confrontation with such a mimetic conception of the subject in its
gendered, racial and political manifestations. It is well-known that Con-
rad’s novella posits a hierarchical distance between dominant and
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subordinate subjects and that, for Marlow, this distance is structured on
the gendered and racial divide. In what follows, I argue that the sexism
and racism at work in Heart of Darkness can only be fully understood
against the background of the less visible, but fundamentally pervasive
problematic of affective mimesis. Sexism turns out to be mimetic sexism,
and racism mimetic racism. Furthermore, Marlow’s initial projection of
mimetic affects onto gendered and racial others returns to haunt the
dominant subject of Aufklärung [the Enlightenment subject]. Heart of
Darkness challenges positivistic representations of subjectivity under-
stood in terms of free-will, self-possession and rationality by showing
how the dominant male subject of ideology is, quite literally, not a sub-
ject in possession of his thoughts (subjective genitive) but is dangerously
possessed bymimetic affects instead (objective genitive).
As we now turn to see, Conrad forces us to confront the process of
ideological formation of the subject in childhood, its persistent psychic
vulnerability to tyrannical leader figures in adulthood, as well as the
ethical and political horrors that continue to ensue as themodern subject
capitulates to the psychological power of mimesis.
2. MIMETIC SEXISM AND COLONIAL IDEOLOGY
This claim does not seem to apply directly to Conrad’s self-reliant
hero. Already towards the beginning of his narrative, Marlow inserts
a punctual, yet strategically reassuring remark about his normal self: “I
always went my own road and on my own legs where I had a mind
to go” (Heart 12). With such a concise formula, the narrator reassures
his audience that he is a rational subject who is usually in control of
his thoughts and actions. Marlow’s habitual self falls neatly within nor-
mative representations of masculinity. He offers a positivistic vision of
the (male) subject understood in terms of free-will, self-control and
intentionality—a kind of subject with whom administrative workers
like his listeners (a lawyer, a director and an accountant) can easily iden-
tify. As Henry Staten has convincingly argued, affirmations like this one
are of rhetorical and strategic importance insofar as they “reaffir[m]
within [Marlow’s] tale the manly bond that is the foundation of his lis-
teners’ identificatory investment in the tale” (142). As long as the “legs”
follow the “mind,” his male listeners are reassured that they are still
within the boundary of a “manly” world of intentionality and rational
clarity (Heart 12; Staten 142).
To reinforce such a “manly” identificatory bond Marlow defines his
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version of masculinity over and against representations of femininity
(Staten 142). Significantly, three of the five female characters present in
the story crop up simultaneously in the initial pages of Marlow’s narra-
tive. The Belgian women he encounters are also involved in the colonial
administration; yet they are described in opposite terms from the male
subject of Aufklärung [the Enlightenment subject]. Marlow’s characteri-
zation of femininity is, of course, not original. He clearly reproduces sex-
ist stereotypical representations of women that were common in late
nineteenth-century culture. For instance, Marlow encounters a “com-
passionate secretary [. . .] full of desolation and sympathy” “with an air
of taking an immense part in all [his] sorrows” (Heart 14). Compassion is
a moral quality whereby one suffers with the other; suffers as the other
does; but of, course, in the context of Belgian colonialism, being compas-
sionate is a contradiction in terms—a contradiction suggesting that
women’s so-called “over-emotional” tendencies blind their critical judg-
ment. But compassion is not the only affect Marlow invokes in order to
distance his position from femininity. Moving to the sphere of psy-
chopathology, he compares the other secretary’s behavior to a “som-
nambulist” (Heart 13): “[she] got up and walked straight at me—still
knitting with downcast eyes—and only just as I began to think of getting
out of her way, as you would for a somnambulist, stood still and looked
up” (Heart 13). If the ironic reference to compassion suggests the secre-
tary’s ideological blindness, the comparison to somnambulism—a psy-
chic pathology that was much discussed in the last decades of the
nineteenth century—suggests a passive, mechanical and mindless sub-
jugation to the colonial administration. In short, both somnambulism
and compassion are mimetic affects that dispossess these female sub-
jects of their sobering rational control over themselves.4 Unlike Mar-
low’s feet, these women’s feet do not follow their mind, but the orders of
the dominant colonial machinery instead.
Marlow’s ironic distance with respect to women continues if we turn
to consider the third case of mimetic femininity: i.e., the enthusiastic
woman. Speaking of that “enthusiastic soul” who is his aunt, Marlow
leaves no doubts as to her mimetic disposition: “There had been a lot
of such rot let loose in print and talk just about that time, and the
excellent woman living right in the rush of all that humbug got carried
off her feet. She talked about ‘weaning those ignorant millions from
their horrid ways’” (Heart 12, 16). Conrad’s critique of colonialism is of-
ten inextricably intertwined with a critique of mass media, but in Heart
of Darkness his attack concerns not only the newspapers’ ideological
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content but also the powerful impact of this medium on the psychic life
of the readers—in this case, feminine readers.5According to Conrad, this
new medium is responsible for an imitative psychic disposition that
spreads contagiously across the masses of readers. This point was also
made by social psychologists writing at the turn of the century who
were beginning to account for the psychological impact of mass media
on to the public. The criminologist and social psychologist Gabriel
Tarde, in L’opinion et la foule [The Opinion and the Crowd] (1901), extending
Lombroso’s social concerns from physiognomy to psychology, explains
this phenomenon in terms of “imitation” and does not hesitate to com-
pare the psychic state of the reading public to “somnambulism” (Heart
13).6 For Tarde, the reassuring knowledge that news is shared, every
morning, by the mass of other readers, powerfully endows such arbi-
trary beliefs with the quasi-religious status of truth and has the power to
(dis)possess subjects of their ability to think critically. Similarly, Conrad
implies that the hypocritical belief that colonialism entails “bringing
light, and faith and commerce to the dark places of the earth” and at the
same time, presumably out of a sheer compassion, “weaning those igno-
rant millions from their horrid ways” affects, like a virus, the psychic
lives of all members of the public (Heart 16).7 Hence, the aunt, over-
whelmed by the contagious power of “print” and “talk” feels rightfully
entitled to define Marlow as “an emissary of light,” “a lower sort of
apostle”—in short, as a modern savoir who has come to rid the world of
evil (Heart 16, 15).
We could then say that the “enthusiastic” aunt’s thoughts are, quite
literally, not her own (Heart 12). Another speaks through her, namely the
idol of colonial ideology. The aunt is, indeed, “enthusiastic” in the Pla-
tonic sense of the term (from Greek entousiazein, “to be possessed by a
god”) (“Enthusiastic”).8 Knowing whether Conrad had read Plato or got
the etymological meaning of “enthusiasm” second hand is not the point.
Rather Marlow’s strategic use of “enthusiasm” to discredit his aunt’s ra-
tionality reenacts a fundamentally Platonic, anti-mimetic theoretical
gesture, a gesture we shall repeatedly encounter as we continue to fol-
low the mimetic undercurrent which connects Heart of Darkness’s multi-
ple “enthusiastic outbreak[s]” (Heart 12, 37). Conrad’s awareness of the
psychological implications inherent in the (Platonic) concept of enthusi-
asm should not come as a surprise. This notion is closely related to
poetic inspiration, a phenomenon of daily concern for a writer, and
its influence loomed large in the English Romantic and pre-Romantic lit-
erary tradition.9 Thus, if it is true that the aunt’s enthusiastic zeal for
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the colonial cause is closer to “religious zealots” and mimetic crowds
than to inspired poets, it is equally true that psychologically speaking,
both phenomena are clear manifestations of mimetic (dis)possession
(Abrams 190).
At this stage in the narrative, the critique of mimetic subjectivity we
have barely begun to encounter does not concern every subject indis-
criminately. Marlow, for one, remains critically alert with respect to the
colonial ideology and praxis his aunt advocates. Thus, he not only af-
firms that her colonial idealism makes him “quite uncomfortable,” but
he even opposes it on a solid materialistic ground, “ventur[ing] to hint
that the Company was run for profit” (Heart 16). Men like Marlow, in
other words, seem to be able to keep their critical distance from media-
tized ideological suggestions, whereas “enthusiastic soul[s]” are hope-
lessly hypnotized by any kind of “sentimental pretense” they read in the
papers (Heart 10). This, at least, is the psycho-political lesson the narra-
tor draws from his meeting with women: he says to his male listeners:
“It’s queer how out of touch with truth women are! They live in a world
of their own [. . .] too beautiful altogether” (Heart 16). And he adds,
“[s]ome confounded fact, we men have been living contentedly with
ever since the day of creation, would start up and knock the whole thing
over” (Heart 16). Marlow’s rhetorical move is clear. Moving to a higher
level of generality he contrasts women to men, relegating the former to
the sphere of delusory fantasy while, at the same time, elevating the lat-
ter to a virile sphere of pure “facts” and “truth” (Heart 16).
As Conrad swings the pendulum of Marlow’s narrative away from
femininity we are clearly confronted with what Garret Steward defines
as “Marlow’s often discussed view of women as cocooned dreamers
whom a touch of reality would wilt” (371). Sexism, however, is not the
only issue. At stake in Marlow’s complex attitude towards women is a
tacit, yet fundamental difficulty in taking hold of a mimetic conception
of the subject. Mimesis is, thus, not only disavowed but also projected
onto gendered others. In fact, if we sum up his considerations onwomen
as they appear condensed in less than four pages the following crude
mimetic evaluation ensues (Heart 12–6). For Marlow, women are som-
nambulistic-compassionate-enthusiastic creatures. As such, they are in-
evitably predisposed to easily get carried off their feet by all kinds of
ideological “rot” that appears in print, while men’s feet and minds con-
tinue to diligently trade the path of “facts” and “truth” (Heart 15, 16).
Marlow’s sexism, in short, should be qualified asmimetic sexism.
And yet, if we place these considerations on gender in a wider
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textual topography, we begin to notice that Marlow’s narrative oscilla-
tion away from mimetic femininity is but a countermovement which at-
tempts to compensate a previous oscillation towards both femininity and
mimetic subjectivity. For instance, while defining himself over and
against mimetic women, the narrator is fully aware that both his colonial
adventure is predicated on the feminine/mimetic “world” he explicitly
repudiates (Heart 16). “Then—would you believe it—I tried the women.
I, Charlie Marlow, set the women to work—to get a job! Heavens! Well,
you see, the notion drove me” (Heart 12). The tone as well as the rhetori-
cal emphasis on disbelief that inform this passage is clearly meant to so-
licit sympathy from his male audience and to preserve the boundaries of
(male) group identification upon which the success of his narrative de-
pends. Yet we cannot fail to notice a certain anxiety in Marlow’s voice—
an anxiety which compels him to give linguistic substance to his feeling
of selfhood (notice the string of personal signifiers “I, Charlie Marlow”)
in opposition to the anonymous other (“women”) (Heart 12). This pas-
sage makes clear that Marlow is painfully aware of his dependency on
the feminine “world” he openly condemns (Heart 16). Moreover, Mar-
low’s admission that “the notion drove [him]” contrasts with his earlier
emphasis on rationality, free will and intentionality (i.e., legs following
the mind) (Heart 12). The masculine subject finds himself in a position of
both grammatical and psychic passivity which resonates with the kind
of mimetic suggestibility the narrator denounces in women. Despite the
initial distance Marlow posits between women and men, suggestible
and non-suggestible subjects, the subject of Aufklärung [the Enlighten-
ment subject] and the subject of mimesis, such a distance is not as ab-
solute as he would like to think.
And not surprisingly so. In fact, Marlow’s own colonial adventure is
rooted in a passive mimetic disposition which not only approximates
but far exceeds his mimetic representation of women. Here is a thorough
explanation of the psychic origins of his adventure:
Now when I was a little chap I had a passion for maps. I would look for
hours at South America, or Africa, or Australia and lose myself in all the
glories of exploration . . . I would put my finger on [an inviting space on
a map] and say: When I grow up I will go there . . . True, by this time it
was not a blank space any more . . . It had ceased to be a blank space of
delightful mystery—a white patch for a boy to dream gloriously over. It
had become a place of darkness. But there was in it one river, especially, a
mighty big river that you could see on the map resembling an immense
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snake uncoiled, with its head in the sea, its body at rest curving afar over
a vast country and its tail lost in the depths of the land.And as I looked at
the map of it in a shop—window it fascinated me as a snake would a
bird—a silly little bird [. . .] [I] could not shake off the idea. The snake
had charmedme. (Heart 11–12)
Marlow’s claim not be influenced by colonial “humbug” does not mean
that he has always been immune to it (Heart 16). His childish “passion
for maps” (the colonial instrument par excellence) is predicated on a
mimetic affect that totally deprives him of his critical presence to self-
hood (Heart 11). The trope of the “snake” and the “silly little bird” per-
fectly capture the state of psychic passivity and dispossession so
characteristic of mimesis (Heart 12). Marlow is quite literally hypnotized
and deprived of mastery over his feet and thoughts; and as he is in such
a dreamy-hypnotic-mimetic state, he is, once again, affected by his
childish dreams concerning the “glories of exploration” (Heart 11). Thus,
as a child, he is literally compelled to turn this “white patch” into a men-
tal landscapewhere he can “dream” and “lose” himself for hours (Heart 11,
12). To put it in Platonic language, a capitulation to the power of colonial
suggestion has already taken place as Marlowwas a “young and tender”
creature who is “best molded and takes the impression that one wishes
to stamp upon it”—the impression of a colonist as it were (Republic 624).
With time, Marlow the “little chap” turns into a self-reliant “seaman”
and “wanderer,” and the “white patch for a boy to dream gloriously
over” turns into a “place of darkness” (Heart 9, 12). And yet, both the
map’s hypnotic power and Marlow’s suggestibility to it remain essen-
tially the same. In fact, the suggestive trope of the “snake” and the
“charmed” “bird” unable to “shake off the idea” of colonial “explo-
ration” (and the “glories” that go with it), do not apply to Marlow the
“little chap” but, rather, to Marlow the adult “wanderer” walking in the
streets of London, looking at “shop-window[s]” (Heart 11–12). Thus pre-
cisely as he glances at themap,Marlow remembers there was a “big con-
cern, a Company for trade on that river” (Heart 12). The narrator, indeed,
both (re-)incorporates and (re-)actualizes the colonial “dream” (or im-
perative) he first experienced as a child to “go there” (Heart 11). The the-
oretical insight implicit in this passage is as clear as it is fundamental.
Conrad is perfectly aware that the child’s initial psychic impressions, if
invested with emotional energy, are extremely difficult to erase and,
thus, continue to inform the psychic life of the adult subject. In short, the
colonial ethos suggested to him in childhood in-forms in a permanent
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way his “character” (from Greek, kharassein, “to engrave, stamp”)
(“Character”).10
At work in this passage is a dense critical genealogy of the colonial
subject of radical political import insofar as it traces the history of the
colonizer’s subjection to the dominant ideology back to mimetic child-
hood. The affective repetition at work in this dense quote whereby an
adult compulsorily reenacts a passionate attachment to the ideological
object (i.e., maps) that fascinated him in his childhood unmercifully
exposes the limits of the humanist notion of free-will and confirms
the Conradian subject’s passive-malleable-hypnotic—that is, mimetic—
status. Moreover, the fact that Conrad immediately places the subject in
a socio-political field (i.e., a field which has the power to inform citizens
by inducing in them the beliefs that dominate a given society) indicates
that his critique of the subject does not stop at the psychological/
personal level but, rather, involves a political dimension. The radicalism
of Conrad’s tacit critique of the subject of ideology stems from a dual re-
alization. First, a hypnotic state of dispossession characterizes the domi-
nant subject of ideology (i.e., his choices, values, and aspirations), and,
thus, mimesis cannot easily be displaced on the side of femininity alone.
Second, this psychic state of dispossession is far from being something
extra-ordinary. As the “case of Marlow” suggests, it is instead such an
ordinary everyday experience which, especially in childhood (though
not only), can be triggered by any ideologically charged commodity—a
map, in the old days was still enough to trigger a child’s enthusiastic
imagination, now the same effect is achieved in an amplified manner
through war toys and videogames. Conrad shows us that the male sub-
ject of ideology is not only the subject of Aufklärung [the Enlightenment
subject] (alias the rational man) but also the subject of mimesis (alias the
“silly little bird”) (Heart 12).11
If we now return to reevaluate critically Marlow’s considerations on
gender, we notice that a countermovement swings him towards the
mimetic conception of the subject he denounces in women. This second,
more insidious, oscillation begins to undermine the distance to mimetic
affects he previously set up. In fact, the “charmed”Marlow finds himself
in a psychic position that not only approximates, but even exceeds the
mimetic representations of women; his childish “dream” concerning the
“glories of exploration” relegates him to what we could call, using his
sexist language against him, “a world of [his] own [. . .] too beautiful al-
together” (Heart 12, 11, 16). Moreover, Marlow’s “manly” colonialist proj-
ect is not only compared to a childish fantasy but, more radically, is shown
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to be founded andmotivated by a mimetic dispossession that took place
in childhood (Staten 142). This passage swings a representation of male
subjectivity understood in terms of rational self-control towards a dan-
gerous oeniric region of suggestibility, passivity, depersonalization and
mimetic vulnerability. Conrad sets the pendulum of Marlow’s narrative
in motion and begins to conjure the phantom of mimesis.
Clearly Marlow’s psychology is not as stable as it first appears to be,
insofar as the affective mimesis he tends to foreclose is inevitably consti-
tutive of his own psychic life. What Jonathan Dollimore says of Heart of
Darkness’s treatment of race is equally true of gender: “in the very
process of defining itself over and against the primitive, the civilized is
invaded by the other whose history and proximity it requires yet dis-
avows” (148). And if Marlow’s take on femininity cannot be dissociated
from his take on mimesis, the same thing can be said with respect to
Marlow’s equally problematic take on race. As a result, I move from
Marlow’smimetic sexism to hismimetic racism.
3. RACIST RHETORIC / MIMETIC RHETORIC
Marlow’s understanding of racial differences in Part II is often predicated
upon a violent hierarchy that is reminiscent of his earlier considerations
on gender. In a notorious passage, Marlow introduces a distinction be-
tween subjects who are in possession of themselves (whitemen) and sub-
jects who are not (“prehistoric m[e]n”); and, once again, the notion of
“enthusiasm” pops up in order to mark a difference between mimetic
and non-mimetic subjects (Heart 37). Here is Marlow’s description of his
encounter with anAfrican tribe on the shores of the river Congo:
a burst of yells, a whirl of black limbs, a mass of hands clapping, of feet
stamping, of bodies swaying, of eyes rolling under the droop of heavy
and motionless foliage. The steamer toiled along slowly on the edge of a
black and incomprehensible frenzy. The prehistoric man was cursing us,
praying to us, welcoming us—who could tell? We were cut off from the
comprehension of our surroundings; we glided past like phantoms,
wondering and secretly appalled, as sane men would be before an en-
thusiastic outbreak in a madhouse. (Heart 37)
As with Marlow’s “enthusiastic” aunt, the Africans’ “enthusiastic out-
break” seems to deprive racial subjects of rational control over them-
selves (Heart 12, 37). Yet, the mimetic degree of such subjects is much
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more accentuated and acquires a bodily dimensionwhichwas lacking in
the somnambulistic-compassionate-enthusiastic Belgian women. If the
aunt was part of a purely psychic mass (i.e. a public), the Africans are
part of a physical mass (i.e., a crowd). Moreover, if the aunt was only
metaphorically “carried off her feet,” the Africans are literally so (Heart
16). In fact, Conrad’s detailed physical description (“a mass of hands
clapping, of feet stamping, of bodies swaying, of eyes rolling”) makes
strikingly clear that he has in mind a ritual dance endowed with the af-
fective power to induce in its member a state of psychic (dis)possession
(Heart 37). Such a state of “frenzy” as he calls it is, of course, well known,
both in ancient and modern times (Heart 37). Plato calls it enthusiasm
(534); Conrad calls it “enthusiastic outbreak” (Heart 37); modern anthro-
pology calls it possession trance.12
Of course, while Marlow’s description clearly describes a mimetic
phenomenon par excellence, his evaluation of it lacks the objective rigor
of recent anthropological observations. In fact, Marlow’s anthropology,
at this stage, is based on the naïve, because fundamentally ethnocentric
idea that the mimetic subject is always the other. Accordingly, this de-
scription reinforces the violent hierarchy between “blackness” and
“whiteness;” “savagery” and “civilization” (essentialist categories that
modern anthropology has cast into crisis). Notice also that his theoreti-
cal premises fall neatly within nineteenth-century anthropology. The
reference to “prehistoric man” is predicated upon the (at the time wildly
accepted) evolutionary paradigm, whereby traveling in space involved
a temporal return to prehistoric times: Marlow says that “[g]oing up that
river was like traveling back to the earliest beginnings of the world,
when vegetation rioted on the earth and the big trees were kings” (Heart
35, 37).13 This theoretical move is instrumental in introducing a cultural,
temporal, and biological distance between colonizers and colonized.
Such a distance is also physical (they are “cut off” [Heart 37]) as well as
moral (they are “appalled” [Heart 37]). The only way for Marlow to
make sense of such a disconcerting mimetic phenomenon (that is, dis-
concerting for people educated in nineteenth-century Victorian En-
gland) is to relegate it to the “madhouse” (Heart 37).
And yet, while contemptuously dismissing this state as a sort of
mental pathology, Marlow’s pendulum begins to swing, tentatively, in
the opposite direction.
Well you know that was the worst of it—the suspicion of their not being
inhuman. It would come slowly to one. They howled and leaped and
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spun and made horrid faces but what thrilled you was just the thought
of their humanity—like yours—the thought of your remote kinship with
this wild passionate uproar. Ugly. Yes, it was ugly enough, but if you
were man enough youwould admit to yourself that there was in you just
the faintest trace of a response to the terrible frankness of that noise, a
dim suspicion of there being a meaning in it which you—you so remote
from the night of the first ages—could comprehend. And why not? The
mind of man is capable of anything—because everything is in it, all the
past as well as all the future. (Heart 37–8)
At stake in this passage is a complex intertwinement of contradictory
theoretical and rhetorical movements which we need to carefully disen-
tangle. Marlow’s narrative oscillates madly, back and forth, between
racist injunctions that dehumanize racial others on the one hand (“they
howled, leaped, and spun and made horrid faces” [Heart 37]), and re-
peated attempts to nuance such racist distinctions in order to communi-
cate the Africans’ human status (“their humanity—like yours” [Heart
38]). Marlow’s statements are, indeed, paradoxical. In fact, he seems in-
tent in conveying both a feeling of distance and a feeling of proximity to
racial others. Racism, in other words, is clearly part of his rhetoric, but so
are his persistent attempts to establish a connection between his white
listeners and theAfricans; rational/non-mimetic subjects and enthusias-
tic/mimetic subjects. Unsurprisingly, over the past thirty years, critics
have been arguing fiercely about the racist or non-racist aspect of these
lines.14
The fundamental question is: what exactly motivates such contradic-
tory, oscillating movements towards/away racial others? This passage
is not only about racism; it is also about mimesis. And amimetic reading
makes clear that at this stage in the narrative, Marlow not only uncriti-
cally displaces the mimetic conception of the subject on to subordinate
others, but also begins to acknowledge that mimesis is constitutive of
the modern subject of Aufklärung [the Enlightenment subject]. He now
claims that a “kinship” exists between his listeners and the “wild and
passionate” mimetic “uproar” theAfricans give voice and body to (Heart
37). He also insists that at work in such an “enthusiastic outbreak” is a
“meaning” that the modern “civilized” subject can still “comprehend”
(Heart 38). Marlow supposes that his listeners can still “comprehend”
mimetic affects because according to the nineteenth-century evolution-
ary anthropology he uncritically adopts, traces of “prehistoric” psychic
life are still present in modern, “civilized” men: “The mind of man is
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capable of anything—because everything is in it, all the past as well as
all the future” (Heart 37, 38).15 The scientific validity of such hierarchical
paradigms has long been disqualified. Anthropology cast the notion of
racial superiority into disrepute as well as the notion of biological race.
But is a mimetic conception as antiquated as a racist conception of the
primitive, or are mimetic affects indifferent to arbitrary racial/racist dis-
tinctions? Despite its evolutionary bias,Heart of Darkness is very clear on
this point. This passage leaves no doubts as to Marlow’s primary con-
cern: he is struggling to convey a feeling of proximity to mimetic, enthu-
siastic affects to his skeptical listeners on the Nellie—just as Conrad is
doing with respect to his (skeptical?) readers. In short, both narrator and
writer struggle to conjure the phantom of mimesis and to prove its un-
canny actuality.
Yet, this apparently linear project to bringmimesis back home, on the
side of “modernity” and “civilization” as it were, entangles Marlow’s
narrative in an impossibly paradoxical situation. He attempts to convey
the mimetic status of the subject to his “civil” Victorian listeners via the
example of the “prehistoric” enthusiastic Africans—i.e., those very sub-
jects Marlow seems to repudiate on a racist ground (Heart 36, 37). A con-
tradictory push-pull between racist and mimetic imperatives is thus at
work in the narrative structure of this complex paragraph: if a racist con-
ception of the subject introduced a distance, such distance is nonetheless
immediately challenged by the mimetic affects that, according to Mar-
low, emotionally connectAfrican and European subjects. In short, half of
the story is about racism; yet the other half is about mimesis. Marlow’s
dialectical narrative trajectory (i.e., affirmations of racial distance fol-
lowed by a dialectical “but” which immediately negates distance and af-
firms a common mimesis) indicates that the emphasis is less on a
disjunctive racial distance than on a conjunctive mimetic pathos (Heart
37). So much at the level of content. But what about the formal, rhetori-
cal strategies Marlow uses to convey the mimetic status of the modern
subject?
Marlow finds himself in an extremely delicate narrative situation. In
fact, his attempt to acknowledge the mimetic status of the modern sub-
ject via the example of the “enthusiastic” Africans in a state of “frenzy”
threatens to disrupt the identificatory connection with his (racist) listen-
ers (Heart 37). That Marlow is stretching such identificatory bonds too
thin is exemplified by interruptions in the narrative like this one: “Who’s
that grunting? Youwonder I didn’t go ashore for a howl or a dance?Well,
no—I didn’t” (Heart 38). Now, within this impossible narrative situation,
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Marlow’s offensive characterization of the Africans occupies a paradoxi-
cal rhetorical function. We have seen that racist injunctions like “the
worst of it,” or “ugly” are obviously instrumental in introducing a dis-
tance between dominant and subordinate (Heart 37, 39); Europeans and
Africans; the subject of Aufklärung [the Enlightenment subject] and the
subject ofmimesis. Less obvious, however, is the fact that such a racist dis-
tance is precisely what his listeners expect to hear.
If we pay careful attention to the rhetorical dimension informing the
narrative as a whole, it is not clear that these racist judgments stem di-
rectly from Marlow’s narrative perspective. In fact, Marlow’s narrative
is not that uninterrupted monologue it is often thought to be but, rather,
it is interactive and attuned to his readers’ emotional responses.16 Such
affective interactions usually take place at moments of maximum ten-
sion between the content of Marlow’s tale and his listeners’ “civil” ex-
pectations. At such moments, Marlow tends to repeat, with indignation,
the listeners’ intrusive ejaculations, ejaculations we, the readers, do not
always get to hear: “Yes—I looked at them [i.e., theAfrican cannibals] as
you would any human being with a curiosity of their impulses [. . .]
when brought to the test of an inexorable physical necessity. Restraint!
What possible restraint?” (Heart 43). Or, “[a man] must meet that truth
[i.e., mimetic truth] with his own true stuff—with his own inborn
strengths. Principles? Principles won’t do” (Heart 38). And again:
“Who’s that grunting? You wonder I didn’t go ashore for a howl or a
dance? Well, no—I didn’t. Fine sentiments you say? Fine sentiments be
hanged!”(Heart 38). Marlow’s rhetorical pattern indicates that words
like “restraint,” “principles,” “fine sentiments” are, indeed, not origi-
nally his own (Heart 43, 38, 38). In fact, he simply restates, for rhetorical
effect, what a listener has been saying. With this point in mind the fol-
lowing passages resonate quite differently: “[the earth] was unearthly
and the menwere . . . No they were not inhuman” (Heart 37). And again,
“the thought of your remote kinship with this wild and passionate
uproar. Ugly. Yes, it was ugly enough, but [. . .]” (Heart 38, emphasis
added). The rhetorical movements at work inMarlow’s voice seem to in-
dicate that racist injunctions like the unvoiced “inhuman” and the
voiced “ugly,” do not stem directly from the narrator, but from his listen-
ers instead (Heart 37, 38). This point is crucial in order to understand the
interactive, affective dimension of the narrative, and the rhetorical
strategies that animates it, as well as to critically reevaluate Conrad’s
problematic take on race.
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Marlow’s racist narrative moves, while in no way excusable, acquire
a strategic rhetorical function. Namely, they reassure his audience that
he is still one of them and, thus they are instrumental in maintaining
the identificatory ties with his listeners—ties which are indeed neces-
sary for a successful communication of the content of his tale. Hence,
Marlow is now relying on this identificatory bond (predicated on a com-
mon racism) paradoxically to bring home the mimetic affects the
Africans incorporate. His narrative is predicated on a communication of
mimesis through mimesis, as it were. And yet, in order to do this, Mar-
low must, at the same time, constantly nuance his racist injunctions (if
racial otherness is exaggerated, mimetic sameness cannot be conveyed). In
other words, racism here functions both as a formal rhetorical strategy
and as an impediment to the communication of the (mimetic) content of
Marlow’s narrative. Structurally speaking, this passage is predicated on
a conjunctive-disjunction, a double-bind which swings Marlow’s narra-
tive back and forth between contradictory poles. Precisely through this
maddening oscillation the narrator desperately attempts to make his
skeptical listeners recognize and acknowledge their affective vulnerabil-
ity to such enthusiastic, mimetic outbreaks.
But Marlow goes even further to bring mimesis back on the side of
the cultural hegemony. Not satisfied with his racist rhetorical strategy,
he equally recurs to masculinist rhetoric: he incites his listeners to be “at
least [. . .] as much of a man as these on the shore” (Heart 38). And in a
similar mood he adds: “if you were man enough you would admit to
yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a response to the
terrible frankness of that noise” (Heart 38). Racist and macho rhetoric is
here invoked to tickle the masculine pride of his listeners and challenge
them to confront and acknowledge their vulnerability to mimetic
affects—affects which lead the modern subject to respond to the “frank-
ness of that noise” by “hands clapping,” “feet stamping,” “eyes rolling”
etc. (Heart 38, 37).
Clearly the heated controversy concerning racism and sexism in
Heart of Darkness is heavily inflected by the less visible but more funda-
mental (in the sense that it informs both racism and sexism) problematic
of mimesis. In fact, what we said of sexism can equally be said of the
racism that informs this much-discussed passage. Inherent in Marlow’s
oscillating narrative is not only a projection of mimetic affects on
racial/gendered others, but also an attempt to take hold of the mimetic
conception of the subject he initially disavows. In short,Heart of Darkness
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insistently tells us that where there is racism and sexism lurks the dis-
avowed phantom of mimesis—a phantom endowed with a kind of af-
fective, rhythmic power to sweep not only women and Africans, but
also white male colonialists, off their feet.
For Marlow, then, it is important to stress the modern, rational sub-
ject’s proximity to mimetic affects. But why? Why is it so terribly impor-
tant that his modern listeners acknowledge that they too, are still
vulnerable to states of mimetic dispossession? Kimbrough’s Norton crit-
ical edition of Heart of Darkness gives us access to a manuscript passage,
which Conrad decided not to include in the final version of the text but
helps us to answer what is, perhaps, the fundamental question at the
heart of this text. Themanuscript passagemakes clear onwhat empirical
basis Conrad persists in thinking that modern subjects can still respond
the “terrible frankness of that noise” as well as the ethico-political ur-
gency to acknowledge the dangers of such a “response” (Heart 38):
You know how it is when we hear the band of a regiment. A martial
noise—and you pacific father, mild guardian of a domestic heart-stone
suddenly find yourself thinking of carnage. The joy of killing—hey? Or
did you never, when listening to another kind of music, did you never
dream yourself capable of becoming a saint—if—if. Aha! Another noise,
another appeal, another response.All true.All there—in you. (Heart 37–8)
In this instance, Conrad’s anthropology is, indeed, far from being naïve.
In fact, Conrad anticipates contemporary definitions of this discipline as
“translation of cultures”—i.e., a discipline which studies distant tradi-
tional societies in order to cast some light on the workings of the more
familiar (and, thus, also less visible) modern societies (Asad 141). More
precisely, this manuscript passage shows that for Conrad, the “enthusi-
astic outbreak” in the jungle is not any different from amodern response
to musical rhythm within a given social structure (in this case the army)
(Heart 37).17 Hence, this example is clearly instrumental in displacing the
mimetic-suggestible status of the modern subject fromAfrica to Europe,
from blackness to whiteness, from a ritual dance in the middle of the
jungle to a ritual march parading to the rhythm of a “martial noise” in
the street of our own “monstrous town[s]” (Heart 37, 9).
The ethical and political lesson being that modernman’s mimetic ten-
dencies, for Conrad, are far more worrisome in Europe than in Africa. In
fact, if some kind of music can provoke the noblest responses in modern
subjects, other kinds can as easily end up in bloodshed. Practically speak-
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ing, if the Africans’ enthusiasm culminates in a ritual dance, the enthusi-
asms of “pacific father[s],” as they abandon their living rooms and news-
paper in order to take part in official regiment marches or parades can
potentially culminate in the “joy of killing” (Heart 38). Marlow/Conrad
struggles to make his listeners/readers realize that mimetic disposses-
sion should not be hastily displaced on racial/gendered others. For Con-
rad, the phantom of mimesis is haunting modern Europe makes it
important for the dominant subject of Aufklärung [the Enlightenment
subject] to acknowledge his own vulnerability to the power of mimesis.
We can now better understand why, once back in Europe, Marlow says:
“the commonplace individuals going about their business in the assur-
ance of perfect safety, was offensive to me like the outrageous flauntings
of folly in the face of danger it is unable to comprehend” (Heart 70).
Marlow, at the end of his considerations on the Africans’ “enthusias-
tic outbreak” says: “mine is the speech that cannot be silenced” (Heart
38). This voice attempts, with urgent insistence, to expose the modern
subject’s vulnerability to forms of mimetic affects. It shows us that all
kinds of mimetic responses are potentially there, in all of us, and forces
both listeners and readers to take hold of the theoretical and political im-
plications that ensue as the dominant subject of ideology gives way to
the most horrific responses.
4. THE HORROR OF MODERNITY
As Marlow and his men follow the meandering course of that hypnotic
snake which is the river Congo, the haunting presence of the phantom of
mimesis progressively intensifies. As the narrative unfolds, mimetic af-
fects not only appear in relation to gendered subjects (Part I), nor do
they exclusively qualify racial subjects (Part II), but appear to character-
ize, with increasing insistence, that “troupe of mimes” (to borrow one of
Marlow’s expressions) which are the white male colonizers (Part III)
(Heart 55). A mimetic conception of the subject and all it entails—i.e.,
suggestibility to suggestion, hypnotic (dis)possession, psychic deperson-
alization, emotional contagion etc.—characterizes the “mental changes”
(to borrow one of the old doctor’s expressions) of “enthusiastic” figures
like the Harlequin, but also Marlow and, last but not least, that tyranni-
cal leader figure who haunts the heart of darkness—Mister Kurtz (Heart
15, 37).
The Harlequin embodies the most extreme version of the subject’s
suggestibility, enthusiasm and mimetic depersonalization Marlow, and
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the listeners and readers with him, have encountered so far. The narra-
tor first introduces him as a subject totally devoid of individuality, a
“beardless boyish face [. . .] no features to speak of,” compares him to a
“baby,” and he soon makes clear that this man without physical qualities
is also deprived of all kinds of psychic qualities (Heart 53–4). In fact, Mar-
low adds that he lacked “all thought of self” and that “even when he
was talking to you, you forgot that it was he—the man before your
eyes—who had gone through these things” (Heart 55). The Harlequin,
in other words, is a mimetic nobody who can assume the psychic form
of everybody. He is a “be-patched youth,” a character of the commedia
dell’arte [the Italian comedy] whose patched costume matches the frag-
mentation of his psychic life (Heart 55). Aptly linking the notion of en-
thusiasm with the one of mimesis, Marlow says “There he was before
me in motley as though he had absconded from a troupe of mimes, en-
thusiastic, fabulous” (Heart 55).
The Harlequin’s enthusiasm is primarily for Mr. Kurtz, and the
mimetic bond that ties the former to the latter can be characterized as a
relationship between the impersonal subject of the crowd and his hyp-
notic leader. “Kurtz’s last disciple,” as Marlow calls him, is filled with a
sort of religious awe as he tentatively describes his colonial idol (Heart
58). “It was curious to see his mingled eagerness and reluctance to speak
of Kurtz,” says Marlow, and he immediately adds, “[t]he man filled his
life, occupied his thoughts, swayed his emotions” (Heart 56). The “fabu-
lous” “admirer of Mr. Kurtz” is not simply under the influence of an-
other subject; he is, quite literally, possessed by that other in such a
fundamental way that the distinction between his ego and the other’s
ego, his life and the other’s life, no longer holds (Heart 58). This subject is
but the “shadow” of another subject; his ego is but the “phantom” of an-
other ego (Heart 58).18
Just as with his take on mimetic gender and mimetic race, Marlow’s
attitude towards the Harlequin’s mimetic depersonalization is funda-
mentally ambivalent. While being clearly ironic throughout his entire
portrayal of “Kurtz’s last disciple,” the narrator is equally forced to ad-
mit that he “was seduced into something like admiration—like envy”
(Heart 58, 55). And he specifies, “I almost envied him the possession of
this modest and clear flame. It seemed to have consumed all thought of
self so completely that even when he was talking to you, you forgot that
it was he—the man before your eyes—who had gone through these
things” (Heart 55). Despite his ironic distance, Marlow is, indeed, drawn
to this “flame” and the psychic consumption it entails (Heart 55). Such a
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psychic state of lack of critical presence to selfhood, Conrad warns us,
has a fascinating, hypnotic drive—if only because, like sleep (or tele-
vision) at the end of a hard day, it frees the modern subject of the burden
of consciousness and the ethico-political responsibilities it entails. In
short, even the critically vigilant, skeptical Marlow is fascinated by this
state of mimetic depersonalization; he is drawn to it, in Conrad’s earlier
trope, as a charmed “bird” is attracted to a “snake” (Heart 12).
This time, Marlow manages to pull himself together and to retain
enough lucidity to keep at bay from the Harlequin’s mimetic enthusi-
asm for Kurtz. Abruptly changing his tone of voice, he retrospectively
comments: “I did not envy him his devotion to Kurtz, though. He
had not mediated over it. It came to him and he accepted it with a sort
of eager fatalism. I must say that to me it appeared about the most dan-
gerous thing in every way he had come upon so far” (Heart 55). Non-
meditated “devotion” to a tyrannical leader and to the ideological flame
he carries, Marlow now realizes, is “the most dangerous thing in every
way,” as it deprives the subject of ideology of a rational ground to oper-
ate basic ethical and political choices (Heart 55). This point is confirmed
by the case of the Harlequin, as he exclaims, in a desperate attempt to
justify Kurtz’s atrocities: “‘You can’t judge Mr. Kurtz as you would an
ordinary man. No, no, no!’” (Heart 56).
Conrad’s hero, in contrast, is severely critical of Kurtz’s power and
the horrors it generates. The fact that he “hadn’t heard any of these
splendid monologues” helps him to proclaim that “Mr. Kurtz was no
idol of [his]” and to sarcastically condemn his “less material aspira-
tions” (Heart 58, 57). Moreover, by uncompromisingly affirming, “he is
mad!,” Marlow relegates that “poor chap” to the madhouse (Heart 56).
From the narrator’s distanced critical perspective, the sacrificial heads
on the stake are not only food “for vultures” but also food for thought,
an occasion to meditate on the horrific effects of mimetic affects (Heart
57). The conclusion of this meditation seems to be that midnight ritual
dances manage to conjure not so much a terrifying god nor an idol but,
as Marlow puts it, an “atrocious phantom,” the phantom of mimesis
which possesses both Kurtz and his enthusiastic followers alike and de-
prives them of a basic moral sense (Heart 59). As Marlow severely puts
it: “you may be [. . .] too dull even to know you are being assaulted by
the powers of darkness” (Heart 50).
Conrad, via the intermediary of Marlow, suggests that the darkness
pervading his novella is primarily an ethico-political darkness which
ensues from a psychic capitulation to the power of mimesis.19 Conrad
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moves from mimetic sexism and mimetic racism to mimetic politics. To-
wards the end of the novella, a journalist tells Marlow that “Kurtz’s
proper sphere ought to have been politics, ‘on the popular side’” (Heart
72, 70). We are repeatedly told that this “eloquent phantom,” as Marlow
also calls him, is endowed with a magnetic voice and rhetorical ability
that dispossess subjects of their capacity to think rationally (Heart 75).
Well before encountering Kurtz, the narrator says: “I had never imag-
ined him as doing, you know, but as discoursing [. . .] The man pre-
sented himself as a voice”; and, as he finally meets Mr. Kurtz, his
intuition is confirmed. “A voice! a voice! It was grave, profound, vibrat-
ing, while theman did not seem capable of a whisper” (Heart 48, 60). The
essence of Kurtz’s being is not located in his actions, nor in his mind, or
body, but in a voice that addresses other beings.20 Not surprisingly, this
voice, as Marlow puts it, “wanted an audience” (Heart 55). Like other
leader figures, Kurtz likes to test his power over the mimetic crowd. In
Africa, where “[h]is ascendancy was extraordinary,” he addresses him-
self to what Marlow repeatedly calls a “wild mob” or, as he also puts it,
“the wild crowd of obedient worshippers” (Heart 58, 66, 72).21
Kurtz’s power over the masses does not rely exclusively on the sup-
posed naivety and mimeticism of the Africans (i.e., the mimetic racism
we have denounced above). The mimetic Harlequin is, of course, part of
the “wild crowd,” but even Conrad’s self-reliant hero is not immune
to Kurt’s “magnificent eloquence” (Heart 72, 70). As Marlow puts it,
Kurtz’s voice has “the terrific suggestiveness of words heard in dreams,”
and Marlow, feels entitled to say that “of all his gifts the one that stood
out preeminently, that carried with it a sense of real presence, was his
ability to talk, his words—the gift of expression, the bewildering, the il-
luminating, the most exalted and the most contemptible, the pulsating
stream of light or the deceitful flow from the heart of an impenetrable
darkness” (Heart 65, 48). The heart of darkness and the phantom of
mimesis are, once again, tightly strung together. And, once again, Mar-
low’s evaluation of this phantom oscillates between opposite poles.
With one of his narrative voices, the narrator openly condemns the
mimetic suggestion at work in Kurtz’s “gift of expression” in terms of
the “most contemptible” “deceitful flow”—a flow that springs directly
from “the heart of an impenetrable darkness” (Heart 48). And yet, an-
other voice enthusiastically celebrates it as “illuminating” “pulsating
stream of light” (Heart 48). For Marlow, Kurtz’s hypnotic rhetorical gifts
entail an untidy intermixture of light and darkness, unbounded good
and unrestrained evil: Marlow is both attracted and repelled by what he
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defines as “something altogether without a substance,” a “shadow [. . .]
draped nobly in the folds of gorgeous eloquence” (Heart 48, 72).
What is true of Kurtz’s oral gifts is equally true of his written skills.
Speaking of the “report” Kurtz wrote for the “International Society for
the Suppression of Savage Customs,” Marlow critically notes that it was
“too high-strung” and that the “opening paragraph—with its claim that
[whites] must necessarily appear to them [savages] in the nature of su-
pernatural beings” which “in the light of later information, strikes [him],
now as ominous” (Heart 50). As he retrospectively meditates on this re-
port, Marlow the narrator can maintain a critical/ironic distance from
Kurtz’s rhetorical pathos. Yet, at the moment Marlow the character first
reads the “pamphlet,” his critical distance vacillates (Heart 50). In fact,
after recognizing that “it was a beautiful piece of writing,” “eloquent, vi-
brating with eloquence,” he quotes a passage of Kurtz’s “pamphlet” af-
firming that “‘[b]y the simple exercise of our will we can exert a power
for good practically unbounded,’ etc. etc.” (Heart 50). At this stage, Mar-
low confesses his capitulation to Kurtz’s “magic current of phrases”:
“From that point he soared and took me with him [. . .] It gave me the
notion of an exotic Immensity ruled by an august Benevolence. It made
me tingle with enthusiasm” (Heart 51, 50).
Why does Marlow enthusiastically accept an ideological position
which he earlier vehemently denounced as non-meditated “devotion”
(Harlequin) or “sentimental pretence” (women) (Heart 55, 10)? It is
tempting to say that his capitulation to the phantom of mimesis is
caused by being in the jungle, lacking what he calls a “solid pavement
under [his] feet” and having “often a little fever” (Heart 49, 43). YetHeart
of Darkness does not allow for such easy pathological resolutions. The
phantom of mimesis that Marlow’s narrative pendulum conjures clearly
shows that for Conrad, the modern subject, with a temperature or with-
out, is equally vulnerable to the “unbounded power of eloquence—of
words—of burning noble words” (Heart 50). In fact, while Marlow con-
sciously struggles to distance himself from such amimetic dispossession
and the horror that ensues from it, he nonetheless repeatedly avows his
proximity and vulnerability to mimetic affects. His vulnerability is espe-
cially apparent as Marlow, at the “culminating point of [his] experi-
ence,” finally manages to directly confront the mimetic power of that
charismatic leader Kurtz: an “atrocious phantom,” asMarlow aptly calls
him, who, not unlike the snake of colonialism, “had the power to charm
or frighten rudimentary souls” (Heart 11, 59, 51, my emphasis). The nar-
rator adds, in a confessional tone: “he had conquered one soul in the
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world that was neither rudimentary nor tainted with self-seeking”
(Heart 51).
At stake in Marlow’s narrative is not only a personal avowal of his
own suggestibility to Kurtz’s mimetic, rhetorical power, but also a real-
ization of its political impact on the dominant body politic. Conrad’s
narrative makes clear that the phantom of mimesis is indifferent to hu-
man, all too human, racial, gendered and cultural categorizations. In
fact, this kind of “magnificent eloquence” does not only have the same
effect on Marlow as on his aunt, but also equally affects European as it
doesAfricans (Heart 70). Once back in Belgium, a journalist tells Marlow
“Heavens! How that man could talk! He electrified large meetings [. . .]
He would have been a splendid leader of an extreme party” (Heart 71).
The leader figure may move around the world, but his electrifying or, as
Plato would say, “magnetic” power, as well as the predisposition of
crowds to be mesmerized by his mimetic power, remains fundamentally
the same: whether “the magic current of phrases” appear in “print,”
“talk,” “pamphlets,” speeches in the jungle or “at large meetings” in Eu-
rope, or any other dominant empire, they have the equal power to “elec-
trify” subjects and dispossess them of rational control over themselves
(Heart 50–51, 71). In short, the powers of darkness, and the horrors that
ensue, cannot be dissociated from the threat of mimetic depersonaliza-
tion. The phantom that haunts the heart of darkness is the phantom of
mimesis; the horror, for Conrad, is the horror of mimesis.
History, unfortunately, proved Conrad’s insights into the horrific re-
sults of mimetic behavior, prophetic. In the Europe of the 1930s and
1940s, mass media, martial parades and electrifying speeches soon stim-
ulated the “joy of killing” in usually “pacific fathers” (Heart 37). In this
sense, this text is prophetic of horrors yet to come and critiques in ad-
vance the totalitarian power of tyrannical leader figures. But are such
leaders the only subjects responsible for the horror of mimesis? And can
this horror be confined to fascism and Nazism? Heart of Darkness does
not allow for such a reassuring resolution. In fact, the mimetic undercur-
rent I wish to make visible indirectly warns us that from a position of
safe geographical and/or historical distance it is easy for modern read-
ers to grunt at the idea that a proximity could potentially exist between
ourselves and such extreme forms of horrific historical events. It is as
easy for us to relegate such epidemic outbreaks of mimetic behavior to
devastating historical situations as they appeared in Nazi Germany as it
is for Marlow’s listeners to relegate mimetic behavior to ladies’ drawing-
rooms, theAfrican jungle or the madhouse.
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I not suggesting that Nazi, racial, and gendered others occupy an
equivalent status. They obviously don’t. If the former were radically em-
powered criminal subjects the latter were (and in many places still are)
victims, deprived of power. If the former’s mimeticism is there for all to
see and to condemn in historical documentaries recording the martial
parades Conrad foresees, the latter’s is, at least in part, the product of
dominant projections and disavowals. I suggest instead that each epoch
has its favorite mimetic others (whether fundamentally innocent or radi-
cally guilty) ready at hand in order to let them carry the common burden
of mimesis. Deferring mimetic affects too hastily on to such scapegoats
implies recurring to the naïve belief that the mimetic subject is always
and only the other, or the enemy, and prevent us to think through our
own implications in mimetic behavior and the horrors that directly, or
indirectly, ensue. As Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe puts it “to say that the
horror is ‘him,’ Kurtz, is to say that the horror is us” (231; my transla-
tion). It may be tempting to answer this point by referring to our “civil”
status and the moral principles that sustain it. Yet, once again, Conrad
does not offer such reassurance. Marlow responds uncompromisingly:
“Principles? Principles won’t do. Acquisition, clothes, pretty rags—rags
that would fly off at the first good shake” (Heart 38).
Furthermore, Conrad’s critique of mimetic politics suggests that
even the figure of the tyrannical leader is not a subject in control of the
ideological position he promotes but is himself a victim of the power of
mimesis. Not unlike the Harlequin, Mr. Kurtz, is not really a subject in
control of his thoughts and actions. Kurtz’s suggestibility parallels the
one of a most naïve child: “[h]e could get himself to believe anything—
anything” (Heart 71). The charismatic leader appears paradoxically to be
the most hapless victim of the power of suggestion. He is a “Shadow,”
“something altogether without a substance,” an essentially void, selfless
subject who is “hollow at the core” (Heart 65, 48, 58). The ordinary and
the extraordinary man, the hypnotized and the hypnotist, the sug-
gestible subject in the crowd and his leader, share a distinctive psychic
feature: like children, they are both essentially the same in their mimetic
depersonalization; in their suggestibility to suggestion.
Finally, Conrad’s inquiry in the heart of the modern subject’s
mimetic darkness suggests that we should not attempt to locate the
power of mimesis exclusively in specific psychological “cases.” If Con-
rad fundamentally agrees that the phantom of mimesis takes possession
of Mr. Kurtz, he equally reminds us that “all Europe contributed to the
making of Kurtz,” indicating that the leader is but the product of the
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larger dominant culture and ideology which informed him (Heart 50).
Significantly, even at the moment of death, as Kurtz is uttering his last
words, it is not clear whether he is the subject of discourse or simply an
empty shell through which we hear the echo of the dominant mass-
mediatized ideology. In fact, we are left to wonder with Marlow: “Was
he rehearsing some speech in his sleep, or was it a fragment of a phrase
of newspaper article?” (Heart 68). That the question is asked at all indi-
cates that for Conrad the leaders’ opinions and dominant mass-opinion
cannot easily be distinguished. Perhaps such a tyrannical leader figure
does not possess political opinions to call his own: as Marlow asks
“[w]hat party” Kurtz could preside, the visitor answer “‘[a]ny party [. . .].
[h]e was an extremist” (Heart 71). In this sense, Conrad asks whether the
success of extremist leader figures relies on the reproduction of ideologi-
cally charged opinions that already informmodern subjects, subjects who
live in what that insightful criminologist and social psychologist who is
Gabriel Tarde, already in 1901, aptly called the “era of the public” (Opinion
38). In any case, if the Belgian alienist is right to stress that the “the
changes take place inside,” Conrad also reminds us that the phantom of
mimesis haunts not only at the heart of the psychic lives of subjects, but
also the dominant mass-culture that is responsible for shaping mass-
opinions in the first place (Heart 15). In short, this phantom is not only a
psychological reality, but also a fundamentally political and ethical one.
I hope I was able to catch at least a glimpse of Heart of Darkness’s un-
timely, mimetic lesson. Marlow’s oscillating narrative functions as a per-
sistent effort to conjure the phantom of mimesis in front of his listeners,
to make it visible and intelligible and, thus, to cast some light on the ob-
scure process wherebymimetic affects have the power to dispossess and
in-form the character of even the most rational of modern subjects.
Moreover, Conrad reminds us that affective mimesis is responsible for
the incorporation of dominant ideological imperatives, for putting them
into praxis and for the horrors that all too often continue to ensue in our
modern, mass-mediatized societies. According to Marlow, acknowledg-
ing the horrors of mimesis is already a “moral victory” (Heart 70). More
moderately, it is perhaps the first step towards a critical evaluation of
our own ideological beliefs.
NOTES
1. In L’uomo delinquente (1876), Lombroso postulates that physical, cranial de-
formities, testify to innate criminal tendencies in the subject, indicating ‘born
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criminals’ (Moscovici 73). On the relation between criminology and crowd psy-
chology, see Moscovici 71.
2. For critics who argue that Marlow’s relationship to Kurtz is predicated on
an identificatory tie, see Guerard 246, Harpham 128–31, Haugh 242, Roberts
130–6, Staten 142–8, and Steward 363–6. See Dodson on Conrad’s biographical
entanglement in identificatory affects.
3. In a study currently underway titled The Phantom of the Ego: Modernism,
Mimesis and the Pre-Freudian Unconscious I argue that “mimesis” does not entail
simple “imitation” but, rather, a disconcerting psychological phenomenon that
troubles the boundaries of individuation. My understanding of mimesis is in-
debted to the Platonic mimetic tradition, particularly as it emerges in the late
nineteenth-centurywithin the field of crowd psychology (Gabriel Tarde, Gustave
Le Bon and, later, Sigmund Freud) and, more recently, among contemporary
French theorists of subjectivity (René Girard, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and
Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen).
4. Somnambulism was tightly linked to hypnotic suggestion (i.e., a particu-
larly extreme case of mimetic behavior) (see Bernheim 122). Charcot makes ‘som-
nambulism’ (after lethargy and catalepsy) the third stage of the hypnotic
condition in hysteric patients (see, Bernheim 87–88). Gabriel Tarde claims that
“in 1884 the notion of hypnotism had not yet been completely substituted by the
one of somnambulism” (Lois 82 n3, 2).
5. In Conrad’s other Congo narrative, “An Outpost of Progress,” two male
protagonists find some “old copies of a home paper” that “discussed what it was
pleased to call ‘Our Colonial Expansion’ in high-flown language. It spoke much
of the rights and duties civilization, of the sacredness of the civilizing work [. . .]
bringing light, and faith and commerce to the dark places of the earth” (90).
6. Tarde argues that through an unconscious “imitation” opinions spread
among that virtual mass which is the public and is eventually responsible for the
latter’s “prodigious credulity,” a credulity which, in his view, is “reminiscent of
the hypnotized” (Opinion 66). The power of mass media is not so much based on
its content, but on the fact that masses of people are regularly and simultane-
ously exposed to the same opinions (See Tarde Lois xiv).
7. Borch-Jacobsen explains that “to say that ‘opinions’ and ‘sentiments’ are
spread through the crowd by contagion is to say both that no members of the
crowd draw these opinions and sentiments from their own reserves, and that
the crowd as a whole receives them fromwithout, like a virus” (Freudian 139).
8. Plato’s psychological insights into the nature ofmimetic affects appear in Book
Three of Republic as well as in Ion where he defines the “enthusiastic” state of the
rhapsode (a public reciter of poetry) as “inspired, possessed,” literally “carried out
of [him]self,” his “soul” “in ecstasy” (533e, 535c). For Plato “enthusiasm” is the
defining characteristic of the mimetic poet. The enthusiastic/mimetic poet, quite
literally, does not knowwhat he is saying since “the god himself who speaks” and
that “the deity has bereft them of their senses and uses them as ministers”
(534c–d). In short, the enthusiastic subject becomes merely a vehicle of the voice of
the other; he is a passive subject who lacks critical self-control over his body and
mind. Yet his enthusiastic state is contagious: the rhapsode communicates it to
the public, as a magnetic stone transmits its magnetism to iron rings (see 533d).
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9. The eighteenth-century Scottish writer Alexander Gerard, in the Essay on
Genius, wrote that in a state of “enthusiastic ardour,” “[imagination’s] motions
became still more impetuous, till the mind is enraptured with the subject, exalted
into extasy” (qtd. in Abrams 191). But in seventeenth-century England “[a]ny re-
course to ‘enthusiasm’ [. . .] was dangerous, because it suggested the claim of dis-
orderly religious zealots to have private access to God” (Abrams 190).
10. See Plato’s critique of psychic mimesis. As Socrates famously asks, “have
you not observed that imitations, if continued from youth far into life settle
down into habits and second nature in the body, the speech and the thought?”
(640). Notice also that Conrad’s conceptualization of the child’s subjection to
colonial ideology in terms of a passionate attachment to maps involves an articu-
lation between political power and the psychic life of the subject, which resonates
with Judith Butler’s Foucauldian/Althusserian insights into the process of sub-
ject formation. According to Butler, in fact, the “formation of primary passion
in dependency renders the child vulnerable to subordination and exploitation”
(Psychic 7). And she adds: “That vulnerability qualifies the subject as an ex-
ploitable kind of being” (Psychic 20). Plato, Conrad, and Butler agree on a funda-
mental point. Namely, they do not consider ideological power as simply exterior
to the subject but, rather, inquire into the process of psychic incorporation of
the Other into the self. Such psychic incorporation, in turn, is responsible for the
fact that the subject experiences external ideological imperatives as its own; this
subject considers itself as the subject of its discourse, life and choices while, in re-
ality being subjected to power. The political, theoretical, and moral value of Heart
of Darkness does not only consist in an exposure of the process of (ideological)
subject formation, but also in delineating the potential catastrophic political con-
sequences that ensue from this primary (and necessarily uncritical) mimetic sub-
jection to ideological indoctrination.
11. Note that the reference to Marlow’s childhood precedes the references to
mimetic women. Now, if we consider Marlow’s identificatory relationship with
his listeners, the initial introduction of the category of mimetic childhood is of
strategic importance. In fact, the listeners are very likely to recognize themselves
(via identification) in the suggestible figure of the child. The introduction of
the subsequent notions of enthusiasm, suggestibility and mimetic contagion,
whether directly or indirectly, involves subjects with whom identification (for
the listeners on the Nellie but also for Victorian readers) is much more problem-
atic: in chronological order, the listeners are confrontedwith forms of enthusiasm
pertaining to women, Africans, the Harlequin and, finally, Kurtz. Importantly,
the possibility of the listeners and readers’ self-recognition in the mimetic status
these figures represent seems radically dependent upon the initial identification
with the mimetic status of children (a state every subject has experienced, and
thus can identify with).
12. In Ion, Plato compares the state of the enthusiastic rhapsode to “the wor-
shiping Corybantes,” [followers of the cult of Dionysius] who, “are not in their
sense when they dance [. . .] [since] they are seized by the Bacchic transport and
are possessed” (220).
13. For a contextualization of Conrad’s Heart of Darkness in relation to Victo-
rian evolutionary (or progressionist) anthropology, see Griffith 79–80.
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14. Achebe, as he considers these lines, repeatedly ends his discussion with
Marlow’s affirmation “Ugly,” using this expression as a rhetorical trope to shift
the emphasis in the ambivalent phrase “distant kinship” towards Conrad’s anx-
ious need for distance (254, 257). C. P. Sarvan, however, stresses “continuity” and
the “fundamental oneness of men and his nature” (283). See Mongia Padmini ’s
examination of the theoretical stakes of this debate,.
15. The typical nineteenth-century evolutionary model that informs Mar-
low’s considerations cuts both ways. On the one hand, the idea that the coloniz-
ers are traveling back in time, that geographical displacement parallels temporal
displacement (traveling to “earliest beginnings of the world” [Heart 35]) involves
a representation of so-called “primitive” cultures as cultures that temporally
preceded (primitive from Latin primus, first) Western culture (“Primitive”).
According to this antiquate perspective, the racial subject is totally other. On the
other hand, according to this ethnocentric scheme, the nervous system of sub-
jects who come “after,” is supposed to carry the traces of these “primitive” forms
of behavior. Within this typically nineteenth-century (racist) evolutionary para-
digm, mimetic behavior is what is inevitably found once the surface of civiliza-
tion is scratched away.
16. For a lucid analysis of Marlow’s interaction with his listeners, see Staten
pp. 143–152.
17. Once again, this Conradian insight is in line with Plato. In fact, in Republic
3, in the context of his condemnation of affective mimesis, a discussion of the
dangerous, affective impact of music ensues. There Socrates says: “more than
anything else rhythm and harmony find their way to the inmost soul and take
strongest hold upon it” (646).
18. The phantom of mimesis haunts the entire colonial enterprise. From the
Belgian secretaries to the African colonialists, Marlow does not encounter egos,
but merely phantoms. Thus he defines the Manager as a “papier-mâché
Mephistopheles” with “nothing inside but a little loose dirt,” and Kurtz as “hol-
low at the core” (Heart 29, 58). If the former is part of what Marlow calls “mean
and greedy phantoms,” the latter is described as an “atrocious phantom” (Heart
67, 59).
19. Lacoue-Labarthe stresses the power of the leader figure in his groundbreak-
ing article “L’horreur occidentale” [“The Horror of the West”]. Lacoue-Labarthe’s
focus is not explicitly on mimesis; yet he implicitly grounds his reading ofHeart of
Darkness in the disconcerting power of mimetic dispossession, what he calls “the
horror of the absence of proper being” (Horreur 230). Such a horror, in his view, is
characteristic of that “technique de la mort” [technique of death] which informs not
only Kurtz’s power but all devastating forms of the “Western will to power” (234).
Lacoue-Labarthe’s article appeared too late forme to fully incorporate it here, but I
agree with his reading of “the horror” and I plan to return to it in another essay. I
thank Hannes Opelz for bringing this article to my attention during one of our
evening discussions at “The Punter,” in Cambridge.
20. In Chaplin’s classic The Dictator, Chaplin as Hinkel (a direct parody of
Hitler), shows how the voice of the Führer acquires its full horrific power only
when it addresses an audience. Baldwin’s recent comparison between Conrad’s
Heart of Darkness and Primo Levi’s holocaust novel, Se questo è un uomo [If This is a
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Man] is well taken. If Baldwin persuasively argues that Levi and Conrad share a
common concern with “dehumanization,” a mimetic reading shows that Con-
rad’s concerns include such disconcerting psychic phenomena whereby charis-
matic leaders can take possession of entire masses of people via an identificatory
process (185). In this sense, Conrad functions as a precursor of Holocaust litera-
ture, a precursor who perfectly understood—well before Freud’s analysis of the
crowd’s identificatory relationship to its leader—the psychic, identificatory
mechanismwhereby a subject is rendered psychologically hollow by themimetic
power of a charismatic leader. On the political implications of the “toute puis-
sance” [all-powerful] of Kurtz’s voice, see Lacoue-Labarthe 240.
21. Tarde and Le Bon were highly aware of the danger of crowds as were
many nineteenth century novelists. Flaubert’s hero, in L’education sentimentale
[Sentimental Education], is “caught by the magnetism of enthusiastic crowds”
(qtd. in Moscovici 22); and Maupassant affirmed “I have a horror of crowds”
(qtd. in Moscovici 15). In Part III, Conrad multiplies references to the socio-
psychological notion of “crowd”: Marlow speaks of a “motionless crowd of men
of dark and glittering bronze,” “crowd of savages,” and of “the murmurs of the
crowds [. . .] speaking from beyond the threshold of an eternal darkness” (Heart
59, 59, 74). This darkness extends beyond the Africans and Kurtz for Marlow de-
scribes London as a “gloom brooding over a crowd of men” and his own men as
“an imbecile crowd down on the deck” (Heart 8, 67). For Conrad, the dark power
of mimesis does not spare anybody.
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